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At the start of December, President Trump convened the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a truce. The commitment involved an end to long-standing fighting in the turbulent eastern DRC, framing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to unlock economic gains.

Weeks later, however, a completely opposite method for violence emerged. Officials confirmed that U.S. forces had conducted Christmas Day airstrikes in northwestern Nigeria, hitting sites linked to the Islamic State (IS). Via a statement posted online, the President warned, “I have previously warned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Defining Strategic Pivot

These divergent actions encapsulates the defining principle of the U.S. approach to sub-Saharan Africa in this administration: a de-emphasis from championing democracy and human rights in favor of a declared focus on commerce and ending wars—even as this aligns with the new aerial operations in Nigeria is yet unclear.

“We have moved past viewing Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a mantra often repeated for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” said a top U.S. state department official on a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A presidential spokesperson stated this, saying the President “views Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Policy Impacts and Inconsistencies

This pivot is significant, but experts caution it is premature to gauge its impact. The approach is influenced by the President’s personal style, which has included disputes with long-standing U.S. partners and derogatory comments about Africans.

“The guiding idea is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” explained a scholar for Africa studies at a prominent foreign policy council.

Key decisions have included:

• Shutting down the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. A study predicts this could lead to millions of preventable deaths globally by 2030, with a significant portion in Africa.
• Implementing visa restrictions on citizens from more than two dozen African countries and halting most refugee admissions.
• Unleashing a global tariff campaign that has hurt African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

Geopolitical Disinterest and Friction

Differing from his immediate predecessors, the President avoided sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His best-known comment on African affairs was referring to nations on the continent with a crude epithet, which he later admitted using.

“The continent ranks dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” said the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which allocated only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A notable dispute has erupted with South Africa, reportedly shaped by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The claim of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa fits perfectly now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” observed a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Business-Like Relations and Conditional Intervention

A comparable tension flared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This conflicted with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation composed between Christians and Muslims and plagued by security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts suggested that the stern rhetoric may have prompted the government into increased efforts on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had authorized the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has made no secret his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and sent an envoy to try to end the fighting in Sudan’s civil war, as yet without success. While the Congo deal appeared to have been broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” argued one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Competitors

Experts see the new U.S. approach as similar to that of other major powers like Russia and China, who have expanded their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on strategic interests.

“This is a delayed recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” observed one foreign policy analyst.

In practice, the new approach likely means that “a nation that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The diplomacy that we are talking about does not seek to spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a business-oriented posture towards Africa,” the journalist concluded.